ne of the intriguing unanswered research questions is 'what is the impact of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) on innovative corporate stakeholder practices (or corporate responsibility [CR] )?' A literature review reveals little empirical work exploring that link. Using the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (Barney 1991; Barney et al. 2001) and stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984) for conceptual framing, this study compares merging companies' stakeholder-related practices pre-and post-merger.
Stakeholder relationships as resources
The RBV (Barney 1991; Barney et al. 2001) argues that competitive advantage can be gained by companies that have rare, valuable, non-imitable and non-substitutable resources. Recent work on companies' stakeholder-related and environmental practices indicates that CR as operationalised through stakeholder practices results in no loss in financial performance and some light gains (see Margolis and Walsh 2001, 2003; Orlitzky et al. 2003) . Some empirical studies have found that corporate reputation as well as financial performance can be enhanced when stakeholder relationships or the practices that support them are better (Waddock and Graves 1997a, b; Berman et al. 1999 ). The implication is that better stakeholder practices can potentially create better stakeholder relationships that serve as a strategic resource, meeting the RBV of the firm's criteria of rareness, valuable, non-substitutability and non-imitability.
Stakeholders are groups or individuals 'who can affect or [are] affected by the achievement of the firm's objectives' (Freeman 1984: 25) . Generally speaking, primary stakeholders are considered to be investors, customers, employees and suppliers, while government and community are typically thought of as secondary stakeholders (Clarkson 1995; Waddock 2006) . Stakeholder relationships are important because stakeholders can make legitimate claims on companies (Hill and Jones 1992) , because they take risks with respect to companies (Waddock 2006) , or because they can otherwise influence companies as a result of various sources of power, urgency or legitimacy (Mitchell et al. 1997) . Additionally, company policies, processes and procedures with respect to stakeholders clearly have an impact on stakeholders and the natural environment, forming the basis of a relationship that can potentially contribute to the company's success or detract from it: that is, a resource for the company. Companies that are recognised as good corporate citizens are typically those that are seen as having progressive or innovative stakeholder-related practices (e.g. Waddock and Smith 2000) .
Because stakeholders are affected by and can affect company practices, proponents of instrumental stakeholder theory consider that companies develop good stakeholderrelated practices because it is in their best interests from a bottom-line perspective (e.g. Donaldson and Preston 1995; Jones 1995) . Others believe that such practices represent ways of developing sound long-term relationships with stakeholder groups that are integrally based on normative or ethical considerations (Freeman 1999 ) and cannot (and should not) be separated into instrumental, normative or descriptive rationales (Donaldson and Preston 1995) . Regardless of whether the reasons are based in ethics or instrumentality, because good relationships are hard to develop, good stakeholder practices can potentially provide a basis for the type of valuable, rare, inimitable and nonsubstitutable resource that serves as a source of competitive advantage under the RBV of the firm.
To the extent that M&A is disruptive, absorbs management attention or creates significant transition and transaction costs (e.g. Hitt et al. 1991; Hoskisson et al. 1994; Ahuja and Katila 2001) , some stakeholder-related practices may be eliminated or sandra waddock and samuel b. graves
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Shareholder performance implications of M&A
The extensive literature on the implications of M&A produces mixed results regarding the merits of M&A on outcomes for specific stakeholder groups, with most attention going to shareholders (Jensen and Ruback 1983; Davidson et al. 1989; Lajoux and Weston 1998) . Acquiring-firm shareholders may suffer from overpayment, while target-firm shareholders may benefit in the short term, although some claim that the question remains unsettled (Jensen and Ruback 1983; Lajoux and Weston 1998; Rau and Vermaelen 1998) . In an exhaustive study, Agrawal et al. (1992) , testing Jensen and Ruback's (1983) findings, determined that the efficient market hypothesis, which suggests that M&A should be profitable for shareholders, remains unresolved, finding that acquiring-firm shareholders actually lost approximately 10% of their market value in the five years post-merger, rather than gaining (see also Davidson et al. 1989; Kohers and Kohers 2001) . Another study, using a control group of non-acquired companies, finds that post-merger performances of both the non-acquired and target/merged firms is similar (Langetieg 1978) , a result consistent with related research (Lev and Mandelker 1972; Malatesta 1983; Franks et al. 1991) . Acquiring-firm shareholders and other stakeholders may benefit less or experience neutral returns (Jensen and Ruback 1983) , because they incur the costs of acquisition, problems of integrating the target firm, and servicing debt (see also Davidson 1989; Hitt et al. 1991; Ahuja and Katila 2001) .
Pre-merger practices: the context of acquisition
Some ethicists hypothesise that M&A, particularly hostile takeovers, may be harmful to (non-investor) stakeholders because M&A externalises some costs to certain stakeholders thereby reducing the level of innovative stakeholder practices (e.g. laid-off employees, reduced donations to local communities or even lost customers resulting from service impairment) (e.g. Chase et al. 1997) . In contrast, proponents of M&A claim that mergers benefit society and stakeholders because they create more efficient markets and improve managerial performance (Chase et al. 1997) . Additionally, some researchers claim that measurement problems associated with assessing post-merger performance account for mixed results (Brouthers et al. 1998) . M&A occurs to achieve greater efficiency (Avkiran 1999; Town 2001) or to reduce competition or excess supply in a market (Town 2001) . Diversification is another common rationale. Sometimes an acquiring firm believes that it can improve the performance of the target or acquire innovations and unique resources leading to competitive advantage (e.g. Ahuja and Katila 2001) . Because stakeholders are affected by and can affect company practices, proponents of instrumental stakeholder theory consider that companies develop good stakeholder-related practices because it is in their best interests from a bottom-line perspective (e.g. Donaldson and Preston 1995; Jones 1995) . Others believe that such practices represent ways of developing sound long-term relationships with stakeholder groups that are integrally based in normative or ethical considerations (Freeman 1999) .
The RBV implies that M&A may take place to acquire innovation, technology or, we propose, better stakeholder-related practices (e.g. more progressive employee practices, better community relations, fewer problems in the supply chain, and so on), which may JCC 22 Summer 2006 93 have emerged in possibly smaller, less bureaucratic and more innovative target firms. Thus, it is possible that firms become targets because they have certain strengths (better-rated stakeholder practices) or fewer concerns about those practices (cf. Ahuja and Katila 2001) . The present study focuses on six categories of stakeholder practices (beyond investors) related to different stakeholder groups and the natural environment (Waddock and Graves 1997b) (e.g. Berman et al. 1999 ). The six categories, which have been used extensively in published studies (e.g. Waddock and Graves 1997a, b; Berman et al. 1999; McWilliams and Siegel 2000) , represent both primary and secondary stakeholders (Clarkson 1995) : communities, minority groups (diversity), employees, customers (product), environment, and owner concerns about corporate governance. Following the general reasoning above, H1 tests the hypothesis that acquiring firms will exhibit fewer strengths and more concerns in measures of corporate responsibility (gathered by a USbased social research firm on large US companies) than do target firms. H1 is presented below and summarised in Table 1 with the other hypotheses outlined below. H1: Acquiring firms will exhibit fewer strengths and more concerns with respect to specific stakeholders than target firms. Hitt et al. (1998) found that post-acquisition success was related to pre-merger friendliness and resource complementarities, as well as debt. Earlier, Hitt and colleagues had found that, post M&A, innovation was inhibited, possibly because of agency problems (Jensen 1986) . Management commitment to the former innovative practices or time commitments related to the acquisition diminished (Hitt et al. 1991 (Hitt et al. , 1996 . A frequent consequence of a takeover is high levels of debt in the resulting or merged firm, which could reduce expenditures on innovative stakeholder-related practices. Particularly for hostile takeovers, stakeholder interests (and, arguably, the corporate practices associated with them) may be damaged during M&A, social harms may follow takeovers, and value within companies can be transferred from other stakeholders to shareholders, which could create loss of innovative stakeholder practices or new problems. Other factors that can create pre-and post-merger differences include issues of cultural 'fit' between the merging companies and resource constraints, which can hinder integration of innovative or progressive stakeholder practices (Weber 1996) . One recent study found that hostile bidders may be particularly prone to 'take necessary steps' to ensure company performance post-acquisition, creating significant restructuring (and possible reduction of expenditures on stakeholder-related practices) within the company post-merger (Rajand and Forsyth 2002) . The attendant implications of restructuring (e.g. down-or 'right'-sizing lay-offs and related community impacts) could readily result in reduced support for employees, communities and even customers through changes in product quality or service, creating more stakeholder-related problems or concerns as well as reducing innovation. A study of Australian banks, for example, found that post-merger firms may be less efficient than they were pre-merger (Avkiran 1999) . These findings indicate that customers post-merger are being less well treated, there may be more pressure for performance placed on (possibly fewer) employees, and voluntary programmes may be cut back.
Post-merger practices
Extending these ideas, perhaps post-merger performance with respect to stakeholder and environmental practices may also be weaker than pre-merger performance because companies have assumed more debt, are experiencing integration problems, or are more focused on market consolidation and cost efficiencies. Taking the lessons from the research discussed above, we generally expect to see fewer strengths (less innovative practices) and more concerns (more problems) in stakeholder and environmental practices post-merger (see Table 1 ) than existed pre-merger. Thus: H2/3: Merged firms will exhibit fewer stakeholder-related strengths and more concerns than pre-merger (acquirer and target) firms in stakeholder arenas.
Community
Companies create and maintain jobs and facilities, request or put into place community-related infrastructure, pay taxes, provide a potential source of leaders for local nonprofit boards and civic associations, and create community relations, philanthropic and volunteer programmes (Groshen and Grothe 1989; Burke 1999) . M&A may result in a decline in innovative community-related corporate practices, such as giving programmes and other forms of civic involvement. When two companies merge, one headquarters disappears. Since innovative corporate giving, volunteer and community relations programmes are frequently dominant in headquarters communities, the community of the target firm could experience a reduction of corporate community involvement.
Employees
A major expectation from M&A is that the merged company will be more efficient and its employees more productive. Some empirical evidence exists to supports this expectation (e.g. Groshen and Grothe 1989; Avkiran 1999) , although gains are not necessarily passed on to consumers or the general public (Avkiran 1999) . Avkiran (1999) also determined that acquiring firms may be more efficient than targets. This finding suggests that perhaps the acquiring firm has more innovative or progressive human resource-or employee-related policies initially than the target firm, which then domi-nate in the merged firm. Pfeffer and Veiga (1999) demonstrated that progressive employee practices result in higher productivity, yet the disruption of M&A may result in attenuation of existing employee resource advantage in pre-merger companies.
The expectations of employees certainly shift in the wake of M&A. One study found that acquiring foreign firms pay employees more than their domestic predecessors with corresponding increased levels of productivity (Conyon et al. 2002) . Downsizing is a frequent consequence of mergers (Rajand and Forsyth 2002) . Integration issues also potentially have a negative impact on innovative employee practices and create lay-off situations (Weber 1996) . So frequent is downsizing following mergers, takeovers and acquisitions that a literature on survivors has developed (e.g. Gutknecht and Keys 1993; Appelbaum et al. 1997) .
Diversity
Employee diversity is widely held to be a possible source of strategic advantage for US companies such as those in the present study (Cox and Blake 1991; Cox 1994; Hubbard 1999) . Some research suggests that cultural diversity within companies can potentially contribute to firm competitive advantage (Hubbard 1999; Orlando 2000) , despite the attendant conflicts (Cox 1991; Larkey 1996) . The rationale is that companies with progressive practices will attract a better workforce and will have potential advantages in creativity, problem-solving and capacity to cope with change (Cox and Blake 1991) . Additionally, increasing globalisation means that diverse organisations may be better equipped to deal with the many cultures within which facilities are located (Hubbard 1999) . Cost containment efforts resulting in a smaller labour pool may result in less attention to diversity or management attention to this issue may be reduced because of the pressures of the acquisition (cf. Hitt et al. 1991) .
For many of the same reasons that employees might be expected to suffer diminished expectations following a merger, the merged company's diversity initiatives might also falter. Therefore, there should be fewer diversity-related strengths and innovations and more concerns or problems in the merged company than in either the target or acquirer pre-merger.
Environment
Systemic approaches to progressive environmental management, comparable to quality management systems (Curkovic et al. 2000) , are expected to have positive performance outcomes (Feldman et al. 1997; Dowell et al. 2000; Freeman et al. 2000) . Indeed, research suggests that progressive environmental practices also represent a resource for competitive advantage (Russo and Fouts 1997) .
Despite the attention to environmental management systems, there is also evidence that most companies do not take environmental management issues into account when undertaking an acquisition or merger (Shimela 1991) . Cost containment initiatives could conceivably reduce a company's attention to environmental management, resulting in a reduction in environmental responsibility.
Customers (product)
The implications for responsibility for product quality and availability after M&A are undetermined. Product availability may be diminished, through market and company consolidation and streamlining. One study of the telecommunications broadcasting sector found that variety of programming actually increased (Barry and Waldfogel 2001) . Another study indicates that, despite some efficiency gains, the availability of products sandra waddock and samuel b. graves
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JCC 22 Summer 2006 is diminished in the aftermath of the market concentration that M&A produces (Town 2001) . Another study finds that there are mixed outcomes regarding technological innovations (Ahuja and Katila 2001) . Relationships between companies and customers may not be substitutable following a merger (Anderson et al. 2001) , pointing to possible negative outcomes related to customers following a merger.
Owner concerns about governance
Although the empirical evidence is limited, one study of corporate governance finds no relationship between board composition and post-merger shareholder wealth, though there may be a strong relationship between ownership structure and target value in mergers that do not go through (Davidson et al. 2002) . Studies on the impact of mergers on CEO compensation find that CEO compensation increased after mergers (Kroll et al. 1990; Bliss and Rosen 2001) .
Methods
Measures of stakeholder practices before and after the merger/acquisition were obtained from the independent US-based social research firm of KLD Research and Analytics (KLD). KLD's database has been widely used in empirical research and represents the currently accepted standard for measuring corporate responsibility and specific stakeholder practices for US companies (e.g. Waddock and Graves 1997; Berman et al. 1999; McWilliams and Siegel 2000; Hillman and Keim 2001) . To be included in the study, both target and acquiring companies needed to be listed in the KLD database of approximately 640 (the Standard & Poor's 500 companies plus those additional companies included in the Domini Social Index) companies with two years' lead time before the merger and two years' lag time after the merger/acquisition. Pre-and post-merger strengths and concerns are measured separately to avoid averaging out differences in strengths and concerns. Data on mergers/acquisitions were gathered from 1993 to 1997, a period of numerous mergers and acquisitions. Merger information was taken from the top 100 US-based mergers by dollar value listed from 1993 to 1997 in Mergers and Acquisition. Merging companies represent a wide variety of industries, including pharmaceuticals, financial services companies and large industrial manufacturers. This dataset represents the entire population of companies included in KLD's database during, before and after the study years with the appropriate lead and lag times. Thirty-five (after merger; 70 premerger) companies met this criterion. KLD assesses companies on ten measures of corporate responsibility. Six are related to stakeholder and environmental practices: community, diversity, employee, environment, product and corporate governance; strengths and concerns were assessed separately in this study. The Appendix provides details of the criteria used by this social research firm to determine strengths and concerns.
To analyse this data, correlation analysis was performed on all data, including company size (sales in millions of dollars and number of employees), net income and KLD measures separated into strengths and concerns (see Table 2 ). Then t-tests and Wilcoxon tests were performed to determine differences in stakeholder performance (strengths and concerns) between the companies before merger/acquisition with a one-and twoyear lead or lag time. Finally, t-tests and the Wilcoxon tests were performed to assess differences between the target or acquirer and merged firm lagged by both one and two years.
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Results Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. Total sales are highly correlated with number of employees, as well as strengths and concerns within a number of KLD categories, notably: community strengths, diversity strengths and concerns, employee strengths and concerns, environmental strengths and, more modestly, concerns, product strengths, and corporate governance concerns. Size is clearly associated with both strengths and concerns. Multi-collinearity does not seem to be an issue within the KLD data measuring stakeholder performance. Diversity strengths (p < 0.01) are highly correlated with sales and number of employees, while environmental strengths are also significantly correlated (p < 0.05) with sales, indicating that larger companies are likely to be paying more attention to diversity issues than smaller ones. None of the KLD measures is significantly correlated with others. Few differences emerge between pre-merger target and acquiring companies ( Table  3 ). The only statistically significant difference among the strengths in the stakeholder measures is diversity (p < 0.01). At both one and two-year pre-merger stages, contrary to the hypothesis, the acquiring firms' diversity performance is significantly better than that of the targets (i.e. more strengths). These differences are consistent whether the simple t-test or the non-parametric Wilcoxon p is used. The only other significant difference at p < 0.05 is the one-year pre-merger period in the product concerns category. At the two-year period, this category is significant at p < 0.10, as is employee concerns in both time periods. In these cases, the acquiring firm exhibited more concerns than the target. Similarly in the employee category, acquirers, measured at p < 0.10, exhibited more concerns than targets. These findings are consistent with the hypotheses, while other hypotheses were largely unsupported.
In all other categories, no significant differences were observed. There is, however, a fairly consistent pattern of mean performance of acquiring firms being somewhat (not statistically significant) greater than target firms on strengths and concerns. Exceptions occur in diversity concerns, environmental strengths and corporate governance concerns at one year out, where performance is the same. Table 4 presents the results of one-and two-year post merger stakeholder practices of acquirers and merged firms. The hypotheses were that merged firms would exhibit fewer strengths and more concerns than acquirers. The hypotheses were not supported, although some significant differences emerged. Merged firms showed significantly more strengths in diversity (p < 0.01, both tests) than acquirers in one-and two-year time periods. This finding suggests that company size plays a role in innovative diversity strategies and is consistent with the pre-merger status of the companies. Similar results hold for environment, where merged firms show more strengths (p < 0.05, both tests) than acquirers, with size possibly accounting for the result. No differences were observed between acquiring and merged firms for community, employee, product and corporate governance strengths. Generally, the significant findings on strengths contradict the hypotheses and findings of no difference provide no support for the hypotheses.
Some support for the hypotheses was found in three categories of concerns. In diversity, acquirers showed fewer concerns, as hypothesised, than did the resulting merged firm (p < 0.05, both tests) in the one-and two-year lag periods. In environmental concerns, merged firms exhibit significantly more concerns (p < 0.05, both tests) than the acquiring firm, as hypothesised. Merged firms showed significantly more concerns (p < 0.05, both tests) in corporate governance at both the one-and two-year period than did acquirers. No significant differences were found between acquirers and merged firms in concerns on community, employees and product. Thus, partial support for the sandra waddock and samuel b. graves
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JCC 22 Table 3 pre-merger target and acquiring firms' stakeholder practices the impact of mergers and acquisitions on corporate stakeholder practices Table 4 pre-and post-merger stakeholder practices, acquirer and merged firms hypothesis emerges from the relationship between acquiring firms and merged firms. As with the pre-merger companies, a consistent pattern tends to emerge overall, though it is not statistically significant. Acquiring firms' mean strengths tend to be lower than the mean strengths of the merged firm (except in community) and they also exhibit fewer concerns. The statistically significant results suggest that the hypothesis that the merged firm would exhibit fewer strengths and more concerns was not supported, while the hypothesis that the merged firm would show more concerns was partially supported. Table 5 presents results of the one-and two-year post-merger stakeholder performance of the target and merged firms. Target firms exhibited significantly fewer strengths than did merged firms in diversity (p < 0.01, both tests) and environment (p < 0.05 on the t-test, p < 0.10 on the Wilcoxon test at one year, p < 0.10 on both tests at two years). Contrary to the hypothesis, there were no significant differences in strengths displayed between targets and merged firms in community, employee, product and corporate governance.
More striking and consistent with the hypotheses are results on concerns, which appear to increase rather dramatically post-merger. In all categories except community and diversity, target firms had statistically significantly fewer pre-merger concerns than did the post-merger companies; these results are consistent for the one-and two-year lags. The strongest results show up in employee, environment, product and corporate governance, where targets exhibited significantly fewer concerns (p < 0.05 or higher for both the t-tests and Wilcoxon tests). In diversity, target firms had significantly fewer concerns at the p < 0.10 level at one year, with no significant differences two years out.
Discussion
Key findings focus on the similarity of companies' stakeholder practices pre-merger, indicating that (unlike innovations, R&D or technology) they are probably not the rationale for the merger. Further, there is an apparent increase in concerns related to stakeholder practices for target firms following the merger.
Pre-merger comparison
Basically, there are few pre-merger differences between acquiring and target firms. The few differences that exist are, with the exception of diversity strengths, relatively weak. Diversity strengths are higher in acquiring firms and are also highly correlated with measures of size (see Table 2 ). Since acquirers are likely to be larger than targets and diversity strengths are positively correlated with size, perhaps this difference can be explained by the finding that larger firms seem to have implemented more progressive diversity management programmes than smaller (target) firms. It is also possible that, given the emphasis in the US on diversity management in recent years, larger companies have developed more sophisticated approaches to this area because of their very size.
In product concerns, acquirers have more pre-merger product concerns than targets, at least one year before the merger (with no differences in product strengths), suggesting a possible loss of customer-related innovation after merger. One explanation for this finding is that the target companies are attractive to acquirers because of the strength or quality of their products and that the acquisition is taking place because of the desirability of the products. Otherwise, few differences in stakeholder practices appear to be at the foundation of mergers and acquisitions. the impact of mergers and acquisitions on corporate stakeholder practices Table 5 pre-and post-merger stakeholder practices, target and merged firms
Post-merger results

Community
Differences between the acquiring and merged firms and the target and merged firms exist, albeit not always in the predicted direction. No differences were observed for targets or acquirers for community relations. Despite the expectation that community relations programmes might suffer because of the long-term impacts of the loss of a headquarters company, or possible reductions in community-oriented giving and volunteer programmes, no differences exist between the pre-merger companies and the resulting firm. The data show that, in the two years following a merger, merged companies appear to maintain community relations practices at roughly the same level as before the merger.
Diversity
In diversity, there are conflicting results. The merged firm has significantly more strengths in diversity than either targets or acquirers. Interestingly, the merged firm also has more concerns than either targets or acquirers. Strengths in this category focus on the appointment of women and minorities to boards and top management positions, as well as programmes such as family benefits, specialised minority contracting, employment of the disabled, and progressive gay and lesbian policies. It is conceivable that the larger scale of the merged firm permits companies to expand existing premerger diversity policies in the post-merger period, possibly in an effort to retain whatever diversity existed pre-merger. Merged firms also exhibit more concerns related to diversity than either of the premerger companies. Concerns focus on affirmative action controversies and lack of representation of diverse populations in management and the board. Both acquirer and target firms had fewer such problems pre-merger, which may suggest some of the difficulties of the merger process itself in terms of ensuring adequate representation of minorities and women.
Employees
Employee strengths appear to be at the same level for both targets and acquirers and the merged firm. Expectations to the contrary, post-merger efficiency moves do not seem to affect strengths related to good union relations, employee involvement and cash sharing programmes, and strong retirement benefits. In contrast, while there are no differences between the acquiring and merged firms in concerns on employee policies preand post-merger, target firms had significantly fewer concerns in the pre-merger period than post-merger firms. These concerns emphasise union relations, safety controversies, workforce reductions and pension problems, supporting the hypothesis that employees suffer in a merger, at least with respect to target firms, since the merged firm has significantly more of these concerns than the target. To the extent that employee relationships were strategic resources for targets, it seems that this resource may be lost in the wake of the M&A.
Environment
Environment also produces conflicting results. Acquirers had significantly fewer strengths in environment pre-merger than merged firms, while targets had significantly fewer strengths measured at one year out (although the Wilcoxon test is significant only at p = 0.06 and at two years out is nearly significant). Strengths include beneficial products and services, pollution prevention, recycling, alternative fuels and communications. These areas improve in the larger entity that exists post-merger. sandra waddock and samuel b. graves
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JCC 22 Summer 2006 Significant differences exist in both time periods (for all tests) in environment concerns post-merger for both targets and acquirers, which have fewer concerns than do merged firms. Concerns include hazardous waste, regulatory problems, production of ozone-depleting chemicals, emissions, agricultural chemicals and climate change. Possibly, the larger merged firm may be more exposed simply as a result of its increased size, entry into new production or product arenas resulting from the merger, or diversification.
Product
Acquirers and merged firms exhibit no differences in strengths or concerns in terms of product. Product strengths, which include indicators of quality, R&D/innovation and benefits to the economically disadvantaged, do not appear to be affected by merger. In contrast, targets show no difference in strengths compared with the merged firm, but have significantly fewer concerns. Concerns focus on product safety, marketing/contracting controversy and antitrust issues. Clearly, merging firms are more exposed to antitrust issues, and efficiency moves can potentially generate concerns within other areas.
Corporate governance
No differences exist between acquirers and targets with respect to strengths (limited compensation, ownership strength) in the corporate governance category as they relate to the merged entity. On the other hand, both targets and acquirers had experienced fewer concerns related to high CEO compensation, tax disputes and ownership premerger than the merged entity. Perhaps this result is not surprising given that the merged entity may need to reward management to bring in a team that can cope effectively with the merger. Also the ownership concern focuses on partial ownership of a company that has a concern to the rating company, thus the acquisition process itself might expose a company to new concerns that did not exist before the acquisition.
Conclusions
On the whole, this study makes clear that stakeholder practices do not seem to generally play into acquisition and merger decisions. Few differences exist between target and acquiring firms in their stakeholder practices, hence from an RBV of the firm it does not appear that stakeholder practices are recognised as strategic resources in the M&A process. Merged firms yield both more strengths and more concerns than did either the targets or the acquiring firms, while there is a lack of significant differences between target and acquiring firms in the pre-merger phase.
Mergers do, however, make a difference in stakeholder-related practices that might provide a strategic advantage, especially for target companies. The results are not always positive with respect to concerns about diversity, employee policies, environment and product areas from the perspective of targets. Targets had, overall, fewer concerns than the resultant merged firms. For target companies' stakeholders there appear to be losses related to the M&A process; things get worse rather than better for those stakeholders. Although it would take a different type of study to determine this, it appears from these results that the source of competitive advantage the target firm might have had in its relationships with stakeholders may be diminished in M&A. Acquirers exhibit more concerns in three categories than do targets: diversity, environment and corporate governance, while gaining strengths in diversity and environment. Generally, acquirers are more similar to the resultant merged firm in their stakeholder practices than were the targets, but targets can expect additional concerns about stakeholder practices to emerge in conjunction with the merger. Perhaps it is not surprising that the acquiring firm's practices dominate in the merged firm, but the increase in concerns is troubling for companies that hope to improve their competitive performance-including their relationships with stakeholders-via the M&A process. It appears that whatever practices kept concerns off the table for target companies are diminished in the wake of M&A. Acquirers, which are more likely larger and more powerful, can impose their policies on the merged firm more readily than the typically smaller target firm, but this imposition does not necessarily create improved stakeholder practices, and may create problems for stakeholders of target firms who find more concerns with the merged company's practices than existed in the target company.
